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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCING THE CAPACITY TO CARE. 11042 
 
Approaches to care 
 
What is the capacity to care and why does it matter? How is it acquired? What 
are its origins in the early development of self and morality? Are women better 
at caring than men and, if so, is this likely to change with contemporary 
changes in parenting and gender relations? What would constitute a good 
enough family, as opposed to good enough mothering? How does the 
capacity to care inform the ethics of care debate about relationality and 
autonomy and their gender? How do people care across distance and 
difference? These are the questions that are addressed in this book. Through 
them I attempt to provide the current social discourses with an adequate 
psychology as a resource for understanding care, in the domains of theory, 
policy and practice. 
 
During the week in which I finalised this manuscript, The Observer Sunday 
newspaper (26/03/06) had a two-page spread on women who are ‘young 
successful, well-paid’, asking ‘are they killing feminism?’. It is based on a 
magazine article by a British academic, Alison Wolf, who argues that this 
manifestation of young womanhood ‘has dire consequences for society’, 
consequences that turn out to be that the pursuit of certain careers (a 
successful young woman investment banker is profiled) are turning women 
away from caring, both in the form of having children and entering the caring 
professions. According to Wolf, we are seeing ‘the end of female altruism’. 
 In this and many similar ways, the principle theme of this book – the gender of 
the capacity to care and ethical subjectivity – is central to contemporary public 
debate. This debate, including the overdrawn claims and ill-conceived 
arguments is symptomatic of the profound anxieties that continue to 
accompany changes in gender relations in the new millennium. I hope that I 
succeed in my attempt to provide an analysis that is not hijacked by those 
anxieties – which can lead either to amplifying or denying the problems and 
potential of changing gender relations for care. ‘Society’ has indeed in many 
ways depended on women to care and on their ‘female altruism’ to motivate 
their ongoing capacity to care. As the realignment of caring is precipitated by 
the tectonic plate tremors of gender differences, it is a challenge to ensure 
that everyone has access to good enough care, not only infants, children, the 
old, sick and disadvantaged but also so-called independent adults and the 
carers themselves. Can both women and men access capacities to care freed 
up by the relaxation of rigid gender binaries? Through conceptualising some 
universal aspects of self – aspects that go beyond gender as well as those 
enabled and suppressed by particular gender regimes – I envisage ways that 
women and men can tap into the identificatory potential of every human being 
who relates with others through both their individuality and their 
intersubjectivity. 
 
Why is it important to understand the capacity to care, as well as focussing on 
the resources and practices concerning care? When individuals fail to care for 
those they encounter, those others suffer. But that is just the start. The effect 
is not just suffering (which ameliorates) but psychological trauma. If, as I 
argue, people are relational in the core of their being, then systematic and 
continuous failures of care have profound impact on a person’s character and 
how they relate to others. This then creates a ripple effect in the social 
relations around each such person: care-less and hate-ful individuals are hard 
to care for and this has effects on the would-be carer as well as the person in 
need of care. When whole groups fail to care, cultures of hate, retribution and 
vengeance can be created that reproduce the traumatic conditions of their 
own making. There is less chance of the kind of citizenly care that provides a 
bulwark against political corruption, unbridled market forces or religious 
fundamentalism. Moreover, there is created an intergenerational dynamic that 
is harder to interrupt by social and political interventions when harmful 
individuals are drawn to reproduce the conditions of their own psychological 
damage. A convincing test of such an assertion is to look into the biography of 
any violent criminal, serial killer or psychopathic aggressor. They have 
invariably suffered deprivation, not necessarily of material resources but of 
relationships characterised by trust, safety, respect and love; that is enabled 
by the capacity to care of significant others around them.1  
 
A psycho-social inquiry does not therefore reduce to individual or 
interpersonal problems but underpins the big questions of society, politics, 
ethics and global environmental sustainability.  Although I start my inquiry by 
asking how the capacity to care is first established in the intimate relations of 
                                                 
1 It is worth qualifying this assertion by saying that the claim does not work in reverse: not all those 
who have suffered traumatic failures of care turn out to damage others. Some damage themselves. 
Some transcend their experiences through the creative use of internal resources that somehow survived 
the damage. 
care between maternal figures and infants, by the end of the book I have 
broadened it out to explore how the capacity to care is implicated in 
institutional change and caring about strangers across difference and 
distance. Hardly a day goes by without these issues featuring in the news. In 
the same week as the newspaper feature about ‘the end of female altruism’, 
the Archbishop of Canterbury was interviewed on the morning radio news. He 
talked about the political failure to address global warming and its ethical 
implications, namely that because of western people’s energy consumption, 
third world populations would be dramatically destabilised and billions would 
likely die. On the same evening, two television documentaries showed the 
particularity of people suffering through political and institutional failures to 
care; the first about African economic migrants trying to enter Europe illegally, 
the second about the underfunding of care for the elderly in the UK, told by 
the son of an old woman suffering from dementia, as he examined his 
conscience about putting her in a ‘care home’, rather than caring for her at 
home. 
 
Many writers concerned with the state of the world, from philosophy to political 
and social theory, have converged on the question of living with difference (for 
example, Levinas 1999, Mouffe 2000, Connolly 2002, Arendt 1958). Ideal 
arrangements or attitudes are discussed in order to imagine ethical 
connections among people in the public sphere who are different from each 
other. However, few of these writers ask how – psychologically – respect for 
difference and care across difference are achieved. I am critical of any 
paradigm that does not appreciate how psychic structures and processes 
transform and co-construct experience and culturally dominant forms of living. 
My aim is to supplement overly social and exclusively abstract paradigms of 
ethics, morality and care by providing a dynamic psychological account, 
situated in the relevant social contexts and anchored in life historical time. 
This produces an approach in which I ask, for example, how the capacity to 
care across difference is nurtured, from what starting points. The result is a 
rare focus on the effects of life histories of being cared for and caring; the 
vicissitudes of self development that are crucial in a person’s later capacity for 
care across difference.  
 
This is also an unpopular perspective: recent social science has rejected the 
paradigm of psychological development and focused on situating people in 
the present.  It has also largely rejected the trope of the family, seeing it as a 
conservative sphere in which difference is defended against. My argument is 
that certain conditions which start early in life within families (families of all 
types) are usually decisive for later psychological capacities that produce 
caring (or hostile) relations to difference in others. These capacities may 
begin in families but they do not need to end there. Every person’s life history 
is contained in their internal world and this internal world is active in shaping 
the ways they encounter current, everyday events and relationships, including 
the challenge of caring for familiars and strangers. 
 
Care is a broad term which perhaps should be broken down into narrower 
categories, but the fact that the word has come to cover such a broad and 
varied remit is significant in itself and I shall try to work with the penumbra of 
meanings to which it gives rise rather than shoehorn these into tidy 
categories. On care, there is a huge literature while there is a startling 
absence on the subject of capacity to care in theory, research and writing on 
care.  The care literature mainly takes two forms. First there is a philosophical 
literature which includes a substantial body of work on ethics discussed at an 
abstract level. Second are the social work and social policy literatures, which 
tend to be directed towards advocacy for carers and working out the best 
arrangements, supports and resources to enable caring, paid and unpaid, to 
take place. More recently this has included an empirically focused literature 
with both theoretical and policy orientations. Williams (2004), reporting the 
conclusions of a large empirically-based research programme that brings 
together many of these strands, argues for an ethic of care that extends from 
private into political domains and recognises the importance of care ethics in 
people’s lives and how these can be carried out in a diversity of living 
arrangements and family groups.  
 
Because of women’s historical association with caring, feminist literatures 
have been prolific and these have reflected the same two emphases, the first 
taking the shape of an extended debate about the ethics of care and its 
relation to gender and the second looking at caring as an activity. Managing 
the juggling act between paid employment and care is, understandably, a 
recurring theme in the latter. Both are often premised on understanding care 
in the light of women’s subordination; often on the position that caring is 
associated with women’s oppression and reproduces it.  
 
These different tracks often reflect what has become quite a well-established 
conceptual distinction between caring about and caring for (Fisher and Tronto 
1990, Sevenhuijsen 1998, Skeggs 1997): 
 
Caring about which involves social dispositions that operate at a 
personal level and assume a relationship between the carer and cared 
for, and caring for which involves the actual practice of caring, involving 
specific tasks such as lifting, cleaning and cooking, and does not 
necessarily relate to caring about. (Skeggs 1997:67) 
 
My interest in this book, because it is about the psychological capacities 
involved in care, emphasises caring about: the term capacity to care 
addresses questions to do with caring about. The disadvantage of the phrase 
‘capacity to care’ is its connotations of a singular, static entity, whereas I 
address something dynamic, variable and situated, ideas perhaps better 
captured in ‘caring about’. However, I wish to retain the connotation of relative 
consistency associated with the idea of core capacity as a result of its early 
roots which, while they can be modified, cannot be overridden by rational 
decision. Moreover, caring about and caring for are not as separable as 
Skeggs’ neat definitions imply, because in my framework, the practices of 
care and their meanings are part of a series of mutually affecting dynamics 
that have an impact on caring about, which likewise affects practices. Caring 
about occurs in the context of practices and relations involving caring for. For 
Lynn Froggett, ‘Both [caring for and caring about] are necessary but it is the 
latter that lifts caring out of the mire of condescension and abuse of power 
with which it has sometimes been tainted’ (2002: 125). I hope that I shall be 
able to convey what the qualities of caring about involve if they are to achieve 
this not inconsiderable feat. 
 
Once I started reading the care literatures with a question in mind about the 
capacity to care, I noticed that they were often based on an unexamined 
assumption, namely that, given the appropriate resources and supports, 
people will care adequately. Of course given the long history of belief that 
women are natural carers, it is not surprising that the assumption continues 
that women want, and know how, to care. I hope that a sustained focus on the 
capacity to care can further expose the residues of this assumption, which 
remains despite the fact that the natural ability of women to care has been 
profoundly called into question, both ideologically and empirically. What is 
more, women’s identities and roles are changing within changing gender 
relations. Where the care of children is concerned, the assumption of an 
unproblematic capacity to care now often includes fathers as well as mothers, 
as we can see in the shift to the term parenting where mothering used to be 
the common term. In describing and theorising the vicissitudes of acquiring 
the capacities involved in caring, I want first to problematise the assumption 
that the capacity to care is natural, which has led to it being taken for granted, 
and second to challenge the notion that it is simply social, the result of habit, 
training or practice. 
 
Babies are not born with capacities to care and the acquisition of the morality 
that underpins good caring is a complex and conflictual process that is an 
integral part of psychological development. Boys and girls experience the 
development of identity in very different ways because of the deeply 
entrenched meanings of gender everywhere around them. The meanings of 
care are gendered too and so the acquisition of the capacities associated with 
caring is never a gender neutral process. So, throughout this book my 
account keeps in mind the gendering of the capacity to care. It sets this 
question in the contemporary context of seismic changes in gender relations 
(in Western cultures in particular) in order to be able to explore what are likely 
to be their effects on women’s and men’s capacities to care. 
 
I do not subscribe to assumptions about care being the natural capacity of 
women. However, social science has been afflicted by the kind of binary 
thinking that argues that if it is not natural it must be social. Post-structuralist 
feminist accounts have evolved out of the political imperative to challenge 
arguments based on women’s biology and also out of a trenchant critique of 
views of subjectivity that assumed a pre-given, unitary and rational 
(masculine) subject. As a result, however, they commonly risk evacuating 
subjectivity and ending up with a socially determined subject. This applies 
even to the more sophisticated treatments of care as in positioning theory. 
 
Beverley Skeggs (1997), for example, is interested in the way that the 
particular group of working class women that she studied in depth and over 
time came to construe themselves as caring in the context of the training that 
they were following. She draws on a Foucauldian idea of subject positions, for 
example when she inquires into ‘the processes by which the caring self is 
produced through the negotiation and performances of subject positions given 
by the organisation of the caring courses and caring curricula’ (Skeggs 1997: 
56). These courses were developed as part of a history of ‘many attempts to 
induce women to enjoy their domestic labour and responsibilities, which 
Foucault identifies as a form of productive power whereby social regulation 
can be achieved willingly, even pleasurably, by the participants themselves’ 
(op cit 41). Foucault’s account of the production of selves within the circuits of 
power -  knowledge - practice relations is frequently criticised for being 
deterministic, while being a powerful analysis of the social forces that frame, 
constrain and produce subjects. Skeggs positions her participants in the 
range of opportunities and discourses that are available and attempts to splice 
these together with more psychological considerations such as the 
importance of being recognised as ‘respectable’ in the wider social gaze or 
her claim that ‘the caring subject is constructed by the conflation of caring for 
with caring about, in which the practices of caring become inseparable from 
the personal dispositions’ (1997: 51). She does not inquire about these 
personal dispositions. In this book, these dispositions, their origins and 
trajectories are my primary focus. 
 
Likewise in the more applied literatures, there is a sociological reductionism. 
Where there is breakdown of care, material and social factors are emphasised 
as causative: insufficient money and time, competing demands, the low status 
of caring work, inadequate training and safeguards, women competing with 
men in the world of work. Perhaps these have been adequate working 
assumptions. Capacities to care will certainly be put under greater strain if 
resources and supports are lacking. Where policy is concerned, the greatest 
help can perhaps be delivered on this terrain (Williams 2004:73). The longer 
term, intergenerational influences on the development of a capacity to care 
that I shall be focusing on are more likely to elude policy interventions and do 
not happen within the length of a government’s term of office. Uncared for 
children, growing into anti-social teenagers and perhaps incapable parents 
themselves, are widespread and the pattern does not straightforwardly reflect 
economic circumstances or changes in welfare provision. My question is 
therefore not just on what kind of adult, parental care is good enough to raise 
happy well adjusted children but how it will affect the care that they are 
capable of as adults and parents themselves, in families and beyond. The 
focus of this book is parenting and the care of children because I regard 
families (in whatever shape and form) as the crucible of subsequent caring 
relationships. 
 
My analysis is informed by the use of a psycho-social approach; a long-
running theme in my work. Broadly it says that capacities to care are psycho-
social in the sense that they develop as part of self development, which is 
intersubjective, and that the life histories of individuals during the course of 
this development are inextricably relational and derive their meaning also from 
their social setting (structures, cultures, practices and discourses). The 
experience of being cared for is essential in developing the capacity to care. 
However, one’s ongoing experiences of care and its lack are profoundly 
mediated by internal psychological processes. My choice to focus on the 
capacity to care is a way of providing a psychological account of self to 
address the absence of a theory of subjectivity in understanding care. 
However, by taking a psycho-social perspective I avoid falling back into an 
individualistic account, even while challenging dominant forms of social 
constructionism.  
 
I draw on a set of psychoanalytic principles that revolve around unconscious 
conflict in early relational dynamics, starting with mother-child relationships. 
Take as an example, the significance for new mothers of having their own 
mothers around. This should not be reduced to the principle that the mother 
provides practical child care support – though it will likely help if she does.  
Her mother is also central to the meaning of being a mother through that 
woman’s experience of being her mother’s child (Chodorow 2002). Her 
identifications with her mother’s care (including its quality) will be expressed in 
her own mothering practices, which will continue her own course of moral 
development, particularised by her contemporary circumstances - her 
housing, employment, partner status, for example – whose meanings are all 
influenced by how she grew up and what home, her parents and their work 
meant to her. These are of course not a copy of her parents’ meanings 
because of generational changes in her world (Brannen, Moss and Mooney 
2004). As well as always including the social, the psychological capacity to 
care is also linked to biological characteristics. In my analysis I include the 
importance of the female, maternal body and the significance of the different 
reproductive capacities of women and men in early parenting and the effects 
of these on gendered capacities to care and their likely changes in the 21st 
century. 
 Because care practices and practising care are not in themselves guarantees 
of quality, the capacities or dispositions to care need to be addressed.  
Consequently, this book enters the sensitive terrain of the quality of care. 
What constitutes good enough care? There is not one single model for good 
quality care and there are probably as many different practices of care as 
there are contexts, relationships and meanings within which care is exercised. 
But I shall take the view that there are universal ethical principles too (for 
example the principle of avoiding violence against others) and consider these 
alongside the specifics of contemporary western settings in the idea of 
capacities to care and how these are expressed in good quality care. 
 
Family conflict and break up is widely agreed to be influential in children’s 
development, but not all such families produce problem children and not all 
problem children have experienced conflict among and loss of primary 
parental figures. What makes the difference? Often, as feminism has regularly 
pointed out, mothers are blamed for how children turn out, and often they 
have been the lynchpin of childrearing. Can women’s willingness and capacity 
to care (neither as automatic as the ideology would have us believe) survive 
changes in gender relations as they are currently manifesting in Britain and 
other western countries? The individualisation thesis that is central to current 
social theory debate argues that the individualisation of late modern societies 
tends towards self- rather than other-oriented motivations and practices. Is the 
individualising of women undermining their traditional caring capacities? The 
newspaper article with which I began this introduction provided an example of 
this social science debate expressed in popular form. 
 
Individualisation theory provides a literature about social changes impacting 
on the self that does not assume care to be natural and unalterable. On the 
contrary, the concept of individualisation refers to the complex processes of 
social transformation that increasingly produce individuals with a capacity for 
autonomy, freedom of choice and self reflection, and these processes are 
assumed to run counter to the affiliations and care obligations that are 
traditionally rooted in kinship and unequal gender relations in which women 
put the care of others before their own freedom of choice (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 1983/2002). They may also run counter to the wishes and needs 
for dependency which survive in a conflictual form, jarring with the injunctions 
of autonomy (Hoggett, 2000). However, this sociological literature does not 
address changes in the capacity to care, in early or late modernity, perhaps 
because its exclusive focus on large-scale social transformations leads to an 
implicit assumption that selves result from these. In contrast, from a psycho-
social perspective, I shall emphasise the recalcitrant aspects of selves that 
make them not so malleable and also render them vulnerable: the anxious, 
needy, desirous, controlling and above all relational features of self that 
underpin care. My emphasis on intergenerational transmission suggests that 
the account of social change in individualization theory (as in much of social 
theory) needs modification. Its account of how social change produces 
changed subjectivity assumes a rapid adjustment to new (individualising) 
social circumstances. Intergenerational transmission suggests that 
identifications with an older generation (especially parents and back through 
them with former generations) act as a partial brake on those effects. 
  
The socio-historical perspective of individualisation theory provides an 
important reminder that contemporary care is subject to a set of normative 
expectations and resultant pressures that did not exist in previous eras.2 This 
is not to accept the view of the degradation of mothering (see Silva 1996 for a 
detailed critique) but rather to be mindful of its specific conditions and their 
effects on subjectivity. For example, I consider the ways that daughters and 
sons differentiate from mothers to be important in the kinds of caring 
capacities that they later manifest as parents (chapter 5). In the case of 
daughters, the ‘need’ to differentiate is situated within the late modern, 
feminist injunction to ‘be a subject in one’s own right’, while at the same time 
being recognised as having consequences for the capacity to care in 
contemporary western cultures.  
 
In search of subjectivity in the literature 
 
I have said that there is a dearth of literatures on the capacity to care. What 
then are my theoretical starting points? Since Nancy Chodorow’s ground 
breaking 1978 book, The Reproduction of Mothering,3 feminist interest in 
changing women’s oppression has included a focus on mothering as a 
paradigm case of caring, including women’s role as mothers in the 
                                                 
2 Elisabeth Badinter (1981) furnished rich historical material that seemed to suggest that the many 
parents in late 18th century Paris who farmed out their infants for wet nursing did so without much 
solicitude. 
3 See Feminism and Psychology, 12 (1) (2002) for an evaluation, nearly 25 years on. 
reproduction of gendered caring in their daughters (see chapter 2). One 
branch of this interest has extended to consider the importance of men’s care 
in parenting. The psychology of moral development has been hampered by its 
blinkered focus on moral reasoning, but has given rise to extensive debate 
through Carol Gilligan’s (1982) gendered critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
earlier stage-based theory of moral reasoning (1976). Her argument for a care 
voice, predominantly heard in girls’ and women’s moral reasoning, in contrast 
to the justice voice privileged in Kohlberg’s highest stage of moral 
development, created a central space in feminist theory for the idea of 
gendered differences in an ethics of care; theory that embraced the 
disciplines of philosophy, political science, social policy and sociology as well 
as psychology and psychoanalysis (see chapter 2). 
 
Feminist philosophers and social theorists have been intent on pursuing a 
feminist ethics beyond the Kantian sphere of autonomy and justice and into 
the sphere of interdependence, relationality and care. This interest has 
extended beyond feminism. Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy (1961, 1974, 
1985) takes the ethical relationship as central to subjectivity and responsibility 
for the Other. Following Michel Foucault’s (1988) lead, interest has flourished 
in care of the self, albeit largely in the generalising way so characteristic of 
philosophical argument (see Roseneil 2007 for an exception). The political 
science angle on care ethics, notably Joan Tronto’s (1993) and Selma 
Sevenhuijsen’s (1998) work, has the strength of making links to large scale 
political issues such as the boundaries between the public and private 
spheres and the question of how care ethics work beyond the intimate or at 
least interpersonal sphere, across social distance. 
 
Fiona Williams has identified Joan Tronto and Selma Sevenhuijsen, feminist 
political scientists, as exemplifying a ‘second wave’ of work in the ethics of 
care (Williams 2001) with the first wave being triggered by Gilligan. The 
second wave is characterised by an attempt to ‘resolve the tensions between 
an ethics of care and an ethic of justice rather than to understand them as a 
gendered binary’ (ibid: 12). In the words of Sasha Roseneil: 
  
[M]any feminists have expressed reservations about the whole-hearted 
embracing of an ethics of care, regarding it as over-reliant on a model 
of care developed from thinking about the fundamentally gendered 
care practices of mothers for their children, and fearing that it brings 
with it a diminution of concern about the ethics of justice and social 
equality. … We should be wary that advocating an ethics of care might 
involve endorsing a model of self which is so fundamentally relational 
that any sense of individuality, separateness, and capacity to act 
autonomously is negated (Roseneil 2004:414). 
 
Tronto and Sevenhuijsen are engaging with a tradition of theorising ethics 
within the polis, a public space that belonged to men and is even now usually 
defined in opposition to the home (the location of mothering and care). In 
political science discourse, the idea of distributive justice has dominated. 
Sevenhuijsen (1998) pursues its implications into the sphere of policy and 
politics, demonstrating how care can be placed within conceptions of 
democratic citizenship. She argues that it is possible to transcend the binary 
of care and justice by going beyond the model of distributive justice with its 
‘abstract rationality, impartiality and sameness’ (1998: 145) and instead 
focussing on practices in the context of power and domination.4 Once ‘care’ is 
not constricted by the motherhood paradigm, it can be seen, she claims, as 
structuring all human relationships, which includes political and public 
settings. Both these theorists emphasise care as a practice. Sevenhuijsen 
claims that ‘the core idea of the ethic of care in my view is that care is a 
practice, and that it is crucial for developing a moral attitude – and thus also a 
moral vocabulary – of care by engaging in the practice of care. By doing so 
care can in fact grow into a disposition, a part of our everyday thinking and 
doing.’ (2003: 18). Tronto follows in a long line of theorists, starting with 
Aristotle for whom ‘a good polis was no guarantee that citizens would be 
ethical, but (...) it was almost impossible that good men could exist in a bad 
polis’ (Tronto 1993:7). 
 
But what understanding of subjectivity underlies these arguments? A Kantian 
model has dominated in political science discourse: autonomous, cognitive, 
rational; a model that feminist critics have identified as decidedly masculine. 
In this perspective, ethical practices are a product of correct reasoning. 
Because of the influence of feminist critiques, political theory has become 
more aware of the weaknesses of proceeding according to abstract principles. 
Andrew Dobson (2006), a political theorist of cosmopolitanism as well as an 
                                                 
4 Care writers in the feminist philosophy tradition such as Bowden (1997), Friedman (1993) 
and Card (1996) have addressed this binary, but they have not addressed the question of the 
model of self and self development that could transcend it. 
environmentalist, raises a similar set of questions that result in him advancing 
a situated and embodied account of obligation and justice: ‘thick 
cosmopolitanism’. He addresses cosmopolitanism’s principle that the scope of 
political obligations is universal and diagnoses its weakness as being because 
it is based on a ‘thin’ definition of what connects people together in a common 
humanity. This leaves, in his view, a ‘motivational vacuum’ in explaining how 
people might meet universal political obligations, or in my terms, a lack of a 
theory of subjectivity which accounts for people’s capacities to care (or not). 
This is in part due to the abstracted nature of political discourses of justice, as 
Dobson refers to when he comments that cosmopolitanism tends to construct 
‘human creatures as primordially thinking creatures’ so that ‘becoming a 
cosmopolitan is fundamentally an intellectual affair’ (p19). He wants to 
‘thicken the ties that bind us to “strangers” ’ (ibid) in a way that this fails to do 
and invokes an embodied subjectivity which would help causal responsibility 
to be conceived ‘at-a-distance’ (p21). I return to this question in chapter 6 in 
ways that I think help to transcend the residual dualism between care 
(embodied, specific, relational) and justice (abstract, rule-based, intellectual). 
 
The absence of an alternative model of subjectivity also, in my view, 
compromises Tronto’s application of care ethics to politics. I illustrate this by 
looking at her model of care. Tronto did not problematise the capacity to care. 
Her only reference to how people might be able to care is towards the end of 
her book when she says ‘in order for these qualities [that is ‘to care for those 
around one or in one’s society’] to become a part of moral conduct, people 
must engage in both private and public practices that teach them, and 
reinforce their sense of, these moral concerns’ (1993:178). Sevenhuijsen’s 
argument (above) that the practise of care leads to disposition to care takes 
this a little further into the domain of subjectivity but leaves it unclear if, how 
and when, such a process takes place. Tronto draws implicitly on a more 
simplistic model of social learning to account for moral conduct, reinforced 
with the idea that practice is a sufficient conveyor of moral values. In this, like 
many social and political theorists, she reduces subjectivity to an empty 
category filled by social products. The individual residue is therefore 
naturalised, as individual-society dualism dictates. As most moral 
philosophers do, she talks about individuals as members of a general 
category who show moral concern. Often she implies that if the political 
barriers to a care ethic were removed (by shifting moral boundaries that 
currently exist, for example between public and private) then people would 
naturally care (‘from the perspective of care, individuals are presumed to be in 
a state of moral engagement’ ibid: 164). This naturalisation of care is a blind 
spot in the literature about care ethics. If a ‘good polis is no guarantee of 
ethical practices’ what does create ethical citizens? In Fisher and Tronto’s 
initial work (1990), five ‘values of caring’ defined caring: attentiveness, 
responsibility, nurturance, compassion and meeting the other’s needs (also in 
Tronto 1993:3).5 I will discuss the three concepts that could potentially provide 
the conceptual resources for underpinning the capacity to care with a 
theorisation of subjectivity - meeting needs, attentiveness and compassion - 
and in the course of a brief critique, signal the ways that I develop these ideas 
in subsequent chapters. 
                                                 
5 Modified, these then formed part of a model of the ‘elements’ of care which, combined with 
the ‘phases’ of care, came out as: Caring about – attentiveness; Caring for – responsibility; 
Taking care of – competence and Care receiving – responsiveness. 
 Meeting needs, attentiveness and compassion 
 
The idea that someone could desire to make themselves dependent on 
another’s preparedness to meet their needs when this was objectively 
unnecessary is quite foreign to Tronto’s way of thinking in Moral Boundaries. 
On one hand, she reflects upon the individualistic culture of the USA and its 
effects on making autonomy a possible and desirable aspiration. On the other, 
she believes that the possible and desirable state that care is always aimed 
towards is that of autonomy, when care is no longer needed. For example she 
subscribes to ‘the reality that human beings … manage to become 
autonomous’ and that ‘we can probably assert that one of the goals of care is 
to end dependence’ (1993:163).  Her critique of individualism and autonomy 
does not actually lead to a different conceptualisation of subjectivity despite 
her claim to adopt the principle of interdependence. For her, interdependence 
seems to mean that there will be different times of life when one will be able to 
extend care or need to receive care. At those times, she implies that the roles 
are fixed because they are related to physical needs which are ameliorable: at 
a given time, one is either caring or cared for.   
 
This set of rather covert assumptions in Tronto’s treatment of care ethics 
ignores the existence of fundamental human needs that are relational like the 
needs for recognition and trust6 that exist throughout life, independently of the 
ebb and flow of our physical capacities to cater for our own needs. Ironically 
                                                 
6 Sevenhuijsen typically adds trust to the qualities of care that she drew from Tronto; trust that 
she sees as the ‘oil in the wheel of care’ (2003: 15).  
Tronto remains on the territory of the enlightenment subject of moral 
rationality that was so influential, through Kant, in traditional moral and ethical 
theory, a perspective that she explicitly criticises. My analysis of 
intersubjectivity is very different from her interpersonal model that posits 
communication between two or more autonomous unitary rational individuals 
who occasionally need help from others. 
 
 A theory of subjectivity premised on the dynamic unconscious intersubjective 
flow of affect, identification and recognition between people means that care 
is the psychological equivalent to our need to breathe unpolluted air. We can 
survive, perhaps for a long time, in polluted air but it damages our vitality, we 
have to make do and adapt to less.  Moreover, good enough care, like good 
enough air, is inside and outside us inevitably, all the time, whether in its 
presence or lack. This also means that participating in the daily flow of care, in 
private and public domains, with intimates and strangers, is not necessarily 
separate from pleasure and creativity, as Tronto claims (1993:104).  In 
claiming this, she reproduces the common feminist conflict between caring for 
others versus self care or looking after one’s own needs.7 Growing out of a 
primary opposition to women’s subordination, feminism has often, 
understandably, equated women’s caring with self-sacrifice. Conflicts between 
my needs and/or wants and those of someone else I care about exist as a 
frequent, continuous and inevitable part of life. However, to recognise this is 
not the same as conceptualising others and self as representing mutually 
                                                 
7 For example, see  Bell 1993, Card 1996, Hoagland 1991. 
opposed interests. It is simply a part of the experience of conflict between 
multiple possibilities which is the stuff of existence.  
 
The idea of a primary or necessary opposition of interests between self and 
others not only derives from an individualistic ontology but it also renders 
invisible the profound pleasure of the kind of caring that is woven into the 
fabric of daily life. I don’t want to restrict this claim to the performance of 
activities which can afford enjoyment to a carer (playing with a toddler, taking 
a convalescent on a day trip, reading a novel out loud to a blind person), nor 
simply pleasure in one’s own altruism. From an intersubjective perspective, a 
virtuous circle of care can be established whereby a person can take pleasure 
in another’s pleasure who also reciprocates. Someone who is being cared for, 
even if they are quite dependent, is potentially still capable of many forms of 
caring, perhaps psychological rather than physical, for example to elicit and 
pay attention to the state of mind of the carer, to share relevant experience, to 
express appreciation, thus recognising the other. Sevenhuijsen gives an 
example of a care worker with elderly people suffering from senile dementia 
who was quoted in a Dutch newspaper as saying that hearing a word for the 
first time from one old woman ‘makes my morning worthwhile’. Among her 
characteristics of care – patience, empathy, attentiveness, intimacy - 
Sevenhuijsen therefore adds ‘not least, the ability to draw satisfaction from 
fulfilling what may seem to be insignificant needs’ (1998:1).  
 
I agree with Sevenhuijsen, that needs are ‘the quintessential object of care’ 
(1998: 137) but they are rarely transparent and therefore demonstrate all the 
complex ways in which caring for depends on qualities of caring about 
involving attentiveness and compassion. From a psychoanalytic perspective, 
needs are rarely fixed essential qualities that reasonably need meeting 
through care. Some needs will turn out to be more or less objective, such as 
when an old person can no longer reach their toenails to cut them, and the 
care response should be similarly clear cut. The needs of sick people come 
into this important category. But it is impossible to separate the practices of 
meeting needs from the psychological meanings, imported from many 
quarters, which even simple acts will carry.  As I show throughout this book, 
any relationship carries with it the meanings that have built up through the life 
histories of both parties. These are held in their internal worlds and are 
transferred to some extent on to any new relationship.  
 
Care relations are, of course, particularly subject to such dynamics, being key 
to the original foundation of intersubjectivity between infant and mother, or 
other primary carer. Thus physical needs that are the object of nursing care 
should not be separated from the whole relationship within which those needs 
and care are being expressed. For example, in paid care, ‘the disclosure of 
nurses’ embodied, emotional involvement … enables connection with the 
patient’s experience and well-being, and … produces the refinements of 
physical ministration that alleviate suffering, create the trust that subjectivity 
will not be betrayed’ (Gadow 1990, cited in Bowden, 1997 p116). 
 
To complicate matters further, the meeting of needs can be more harmful than 
helpful. For example, it is not unusual for the expression of needs for care to 
contain an omnipotent wish to control the other and one’s environment; a wish 
left over from infancy, where it was useful for survival. I discuss the role of 
omnipotence in thinking and development in Chapters 2 and 3. Such ‘needs’, 
if they are met, may grow without limit, so that we hear, for example, of adult 
men living with their elderly frail and poor mothers; men who still feel justified 
in making gross and unlimited demands on their maternal object (and here 
object is an accurate word). Meeting someone’s needs uncritically can result 
in one’s objectification. Omnipotent demands to have one’s needs met stem 
from a failure to develop a capacity to care which involves seeing the other as 
a person in her own right.  
 
For Tronto (1993: 121) ‘if we are not attentive to the needs of others, then we 
cannot possibly address these needs’. The absence of attentiveness is 
therefore a moral failing. She draws from Simone Weil, who ‘believed that the 
capacity for attention was crucial for any genuinely human interaction’ (op cit: 
127). Sarah Ruddick too regards this to be important, as in her emphasis on 
‘attentive love’ (1989: 118). Selma Sevenhuijsen develops the idea of 
attention as a crucial feature in care as an ethical practice. She takes Tronto’s 
starting point and develops the idea of caring about, as necessarily preceding 
caring for but marginalised from political discourse, without which the 
practices of care lack both ‘a heart and a soul’ (2002: 10). It is thus important 
how attentiveness is conceptualised. I agree with Tronto that it is a moral 
capacity but not one emanating from the will of an intentional rational subject 
(‘the unwillingness of people to direct their attention to others’ particular 
concerns’ 1993: 130). We will not make progress in changing the conditions of 
possibility for people’s attentiveness. These I argue, reside in the evolving 
often unconscious intersubjective relations that surround someone and are 
available for identifications and internalisation. Of course these are expressed 
in practices and to this extent I share Tronto’s and Sevenhuijsen’s emphasis 
on practice, but without Tronto’s rationalist and voluntaristic assumptions.  
 
Recent psychoanalysis understands attention and more broadly ‘thinking 
about’ as developing relationally. An individual’s developing capacity for 
realising and linking thoughts depends on them internalising a model of 
containment that makes the emotional content of thinking bearable. If they are 
unable to do so because the accompanying feelings are insufficiently 
contained to be bearable, then they will not be able to be attentive to whatever 
particular object is involved. Thoughts potentially pose threats to the thinker 
whether they are about people or not (see my account of Bion’s theory of 
thinking, chapter 2), but given how closely our subjectivity is tied in with our 
relationships to others, it is particularly challenging to notice other people’s 
states of mind and how these might implicate one’s own conduct. The 
capacity to do so is not a natural given and so I provide a developmental 
account of how this is achieved (or fails to be achieved).   
 
Like most social scientists, Tronto excludes a developmental perspective from 
her analysis. This has become a dominant feature of the social sciences since 
the ‘turn to language’ with its accompanying critique of developmental 
psychology (see in particular the ‘new sociology of childhood’, for example, 
Smart, Neale and Wade 2001). Although the critique was needed, 
unfortunately the baby of development has been thrown out with the 
bathwater of developmentalism. This is compounded by a feminist reluctance 
to privilege the mother-child relationship as a paradigm of care, for example 
‘too often, care is described and defined as a necessary relationship between 
two individuals, most often a mother and child’ (Tronto 1993:103).  In contrast, 
I hope to show in this book how crucial the early primary relationship between 
mother and infant is for the capacity to care of both of these parties, a 
relationship which is not so much paradigmatic as originary. I hope also to 
show how care can and does extend from such beginnings to potentially all 
relationships, even across social distance. Of course its character changes in 
the process. 
 
In Tronto’s treatment, compassion figures in the context of other theorists’ 
distinctions, which she wishes to transcend, between care and justice ethics 
where ‘care draws out of compassion, justice out of rationality’ (1993: 166). It 
is referred to only in a common sense way. In my view, compassionate caring 
about depends on accurate recognition. How this is achieved is addressed in 
the psychoanalytic concept of identification. Tronto has quite a lot to say 
about identification, but each time draws on a misleading critique that equates 
identification with what she refers to as ‘overidentification’; that is, a dynamic 
where a carer loses the capacity to recognise the difference between their 
own needs and those of someone in need of their care. In contrast, I use the 
concept of identification in the psychoanalytic sense to describe the 
developmental processes that involve the internalisation of identifications with 
primary carers during the early years and which, when positive, can lay the 
foundations of the self and for later care from the position of being a person in 
one’s own right (chapter 3). 
 
A focus on the capacity to care means that we ask how this relation to another 
person is achieved. The psychoanalytic concept of identification embraces 
processes that are conscious and unconscious, embodied, affective and 
cognitive, both primary (unthought) and secondary (thought) processes. 
Without the psychological capacity to identify with others across the boundary 
that comes to define one individual from another, compassion and concern 
would be impossible. We can only know what another person is experiencing 
through empathy or ‘fellow feeling’; that is through using ourselves as an 
instrument of understanding. The capacity for empathy goes far beyond 
cognitive-based understanding. It involves, for example, imaginatively 
flinching at the other’s response to a cold hand or a sharp needle or an 
overhot drink and therefore being able to modify one’s actions. It involves 
psychologically imagining oneself in another’s position.  
 
The capacity for accurate identification is constantly in danger of being 
compromised by the unwitting defences we are likely to mobilise in the face of 
painful feelings. Faced, for example, with a dying person who will not or 
cannot talk about death, how possible is it not to let one’s own fear of dying 
get in the way of experiencing what they are going through? If they wish to 
finish their life quickly, how does a carer separate out their own wishes from 
those of the other – to keep the loved one for ever, to get rid of him or her to 
obliterate the obligation to care, or perhaps both at once? How does one 
recognise and respect the difference between concluding, for example, ‘if I 
were in their shoes, I would want to quit life now before my dignity was 
completely in shreds’ (an example of what Tronto might call 
‘overidentification’) and picking up the signals that, no, they might have 
thought that earlier but now they want to live every last day? Tronto’s 
inadequate use of the concept of identification reflects a wider and enduring 
tension in the feminist literature between the idea that identification means 
feeling the same as (identity with) the other and acknowledging – and 
respecting – differences. She does this, for example, in her discussion of 
responsiveness where she claims that putting oneself into another’s position 
presumes that ‘the other is exactly like the self’ (op cit:136). These need not 
be in contradiction if the concept of identification draws on the complexity that 
contemporary psychoanalysis provides (chapter 6). 
  
Psycho-social subjectivity in care 
 
I have concentrated my critique on Tronto, because of her importance in 
taking the care ethics debate away from the mother-child paradigm and into 
the public sphere, addressing justice. However, the ‘second wave’ of care 
ethics has a wider focus too, if it includes, as I think it should, the work of the 
group gathered within the University of Leeds CAVA project, directed by Fiona 
Williams. This work, with social policy issues at its core, is also committed to 
bringing care out of the private sphere, critically analysing the (gendered) 
power relations involved, factoring in the effects of changing family structures, 
gender relations and individualization and engaging with political movements 
involving marginalised groups such as disability rights and self-help. I situate 
my work in this book at the psycho-social edge of this second wave. 
 
Williams points out that from a social policy perspective, care is a powerful 
analytic concept in times of changing welfare regimes because they point to 
changes in the relations between state, family, market and voluntary sectors 
as care providers; tensions between cash and services modes of provision 
and who receives this, carer or cared for and broad changes in and 
demographic and gender relations in care work (2001: 2). She provides an 
example of how the British disability movement’s questioning of relations 
between carer and cared-for challenges basic assumptions about ‘the very 
notion of care’ (ibid: 10). This arises out of a history of experience of paid and 
unpaid carers who have positioned them as dependent, ‘at worst abused and 
stripped of their dignity, at best patronised and protected from exercising any 
agency over their lives’ (2001:10). Clearly care has earned a bad name 
because it has been tainted by unequal power relations, expressed in a model 
of dependency. Disability activists are thus calling for independence and 
control over their own lives (ibid). As Froggett noted (above), this contestation 
points to the importance of considering caring about as well as caring for and 
addressing the quality of care in psychological, rather than just physical and 
social terms. 
 
Roseneil, member of the CAVA group, argues that care in social policy needs 
re-imagining and uses ‘the epistemological challenge offered by queer theory 
to propose a different gaze be cast on care which recognizes the practices of 
care which take place outside normative heterosexual couples and families’ 
(2004: 409). She has consequently used a model of friendship as a basis for 
her research into care relations (ibid). My approach, although informed by a 
similar critique, does not abandon the mother-child model because, as I hope 
to show, it reflects fundamental aspects of the way that caring selves develop; 
aspects that are modified to a greater or lesser extent in adult relationships 
but which nonetheless form the ground on which caring about is built and 
infuses practices. It should still be possible to transcend the binary between 
autonomy, independence and the ethic of justice on the one hand and 
relationality, empathy and the ethic of care on the other in understanding the 
capacity to care.    
 
With the exception of psychoanalysis, most of the influential contributions to 
debates about care lack a psychology, notably a full, critically-based 
theorisation of the self, and its relational development on which the capacity to 
care is founded. Developmental psychoanalysis turns out to be the most 
theoretically fertile area for understanding the relational acquisition of 
capacities to care and also gets closest in subject matter, for example, 
through Klein’s notion of reparation and Winnicott’s understanding of concern.  
It is also insightful in theorising the effects of sexual and gender difference in 
the development of care. Psychoanalytic literatures, with the important 
exception of Winnicott, hardly use the word care. However, they do provide a 
detailed account of the qualities required by the primary carer in her 
relationship with the dependent baby if it is to thrive. They also theorise the 
way these qualities become part of the baby’s potential, change with major 
events in growing up - for example, the processes of establishing a gender 
identity - and how they mark the quality of relationships with others throughout 
life.   
 
In my use of psychoanalysis, I draw on the work of Melanie Klein, Fred Alford, 
Jessica Benjamin, Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, Thomas Ogden, Ron 
Britton, Juliet Mitchell, the British school of object relations and the American 
relational psychoanalysts. Attachment theory, which originated with John 
Bowlby’s work, has also been highly influential in establishing as 
commonplace the significance to later psychological wellbeing of attachment 
relationship between babies and primary carer. In its later empirical 
manifestations (Ainsworth 1974,1978, Main 1993) it has established these 
central claims and also refined its theoretical principles in the direction of an 
emphasis on intersubjectivity (Diamond and Marrone  2003).These literatures 
draw attention to the importance of relationships in understanding care, not 
just in the obvious sense – care is a relational term – but in the sense that the 
individual, caring (and careless) subject is constituted relationally, right 
through to the deepest most hidden parts of their subjectivity. The processes 
and the product are ethical in their very nature. I use the term unconscious 
intersubjectivity to refer to this idea. The foreword to Diamond and Marrone’s 
book Attachment and Intersubjectivity begins by commenting that ‘The term 
“intersubjectivity” has become contemporary shorthand for a variety of 
attempts to transcend an intrapsychic model of the mind’ (2003:vii). Such 
attempts have become so common in the last fifty years that they amount to a 
transdisciplinary paradigm shift. The term has developed in three different 
disciplinary areas: phenomenology, psychoanalysis and developmental 
psychology. I draw in particular on the last two. Many of the emphases of 
phenomenology are compatible with my emphasis, namely the view that 
‘existence is interpersonal from the first and always profoundly related to 
context’ (Diamond and Marrone 2003: 13). A psychoanalytic perspective 
treats intersubjectivity as an unconscious flowing of states between people 
and modifying them. It thus raises questions about the psychological 
boundaries between people.  
 
Events in the external world are not just mediated by language or discourse 
but, importantly, by people’s states of mind.  By this I do not refer to cognitive 
processes but to ‘mental states’ or ‘internal worlds’ where desire and anxiety 
act creatively on experience and transform it, so that its relation to reality can 
never be simply assumed. The idea of an internal world refers, in object 
relations theory, to a world of unconscious fantasy made up of the self and 
other internal objects such as people, things, ideas and values (Fakhry Davids 
2002: 67). This world ‘provides a template for our interactions with the outside 
world, is itself shaped by these, and is the wellspring of our psychic well-being 
and of creativity itself’ (ibid). I use the term intersubjectivity in this sense. 
 
Emmanuel Levinas’ project to found philosophy on an ethics based on an 
interhuman order is part of the phenomenological tradition: ‘a phenomenology 
of sociality’ (Levinas 1999: 103). This has been influential in placing ethics at 
the heart of philosophy. Hayat, introducing Levinas’ Alterity and 
Transcendence (1999) puts the point as follows: ‘a philosophy of dialogue 
cannot not be an ethics … like Buber for whom the beginning of philosophy is 
not the cogito but the relation to the other’ (1999:xxi). Likewise, an analysis of 
the capacity to care cannot not be a contribution to theorising ethical 
subjectivity. 
  
My approach also emphasises the importance of life history to the capacity to 
care. In other words it is developmental. In thinking developmentally I aim to 
focus on the ‘dynamics of becoming’ (Loewald 1978:6). Development is not 
seen here in the way that developmentalism has been criticised, that is for 
viewing it as fixed, staged and normative (Burman 1994), but in the sense that 
people are a product of their pasts and that we cannot choose to leave behind 
how these have forged us, although changes continue. Ben Bradley (1989) 
shows that developmental visions of infancy tend to fall into two kinds: 
foundational or constructionist. Foundational accounts are based on the belief 
that babies have real limitations that change over time with experience. 
Constructionist accounts of infancy show the ways that different theories have 
been imposed on what is posited as a ‘blank slate’. This is a dualism that I 
attempt to transcend in what I would call a critical realist approach to infant 
and child development: attempting to show how theories have constructed 
infancy and also to assess which ones best answer my underlying question 
‘can this theory give me any insight into the capacity to care?’.  
 
The same critical realist approach characterises my treatment of mothering 
and here any version of realism is likely to run into political controversy linked 
to the value judgements that come with it; for example about the 
compromised care that depressed mothers are likely to be able to provide for 
their babies. Certainly part of my project in this book is to go beyond the kind 
of relativism that recognises no real effects of development or mothering but 
treats solely discursive effects. At their most inadequate, these are the kinds 
of discourses which allow one to argue that oppressive discourses have kept 
mothers constrained entirely for patriarchal purposes and that the quality of 
maternal care has no actual effects on babies’ wellbeing. My critical realism 
attempts to recognise the effects of such ideologies on women’s 
subjectification and at the same time make some realist arguments about 
what kinds of care babies are likely to need.  An example would be the way I 
make a distinction between the biological mother and ‘maternal care’ provided 
by others and also explore carefully what connections there may be between 
babies’ experiences of the biological mother and other maternal figures and 
why. 
 
My care ideal is that an adult can engage in four kinds of care.  First, they will 
be capable of reciprocal interdependent care receiving and care giving. 
Second they will be capable of providing the non-negotiable, asymmetrical 
demand for care that has always been required of mothers and is required of 
fathers and others who ‘mother’ babies and young children. Third they will be 
capable of self care. Fourth they will be capable of extending their care to 
both human and non-human objects (for example, the environment or non-
human animals) outside their direct experience. Understanding how these are 
achieved entails understanding the vicissitudes of the development of mind, 
self and morality. It will become clear that there are many variations on 
capacity to care and many conditions that risk the failure of good enough 
capacity to care.  
 
Outline of the Book 
 
Chapter one. Introducing the Capacity to Care. The current chapter has set 
the scene for my particular approach by discussing its contemporary 
relevance and situating the capacity to care briefly in existing literature. I 
identify a significant gap in addressing capacities to care and their acquisition 
psychologically. I make some initial links to the policy questions in which care 
is a central consideration. Tronto’s widely cited account of the constituents of 
care was useful to introduce why and how a psycho-social perspective on 
subjectivity takes issue with dominant assumptions about how people care, to 
signal my different theoretical emphases and to introduce the core themes of 
my account. I have referred to ideas about people’s capacity to care that are 
based on a radically different ontology from that which is dominant in Western 
culture and western social science, the latter being based on assumptions of 
a bounded autonomous individual. Feminist theory has been at the forefront 
of a critique of this ontology, notably through conceptualisations of care and 
care ethics.  
 
Chapter two. Care, Ethics and Relational Subjectivity. 
The literatures that could most be expected to address and understand the 
capacity to care in a moral and gendered framework are the feminist 
literatures, first on the ethic of care and second on the reproduction of caring 
through the mother-daughter relationship. In this chapter I review these, 
aiming to specify their strengths, weaknesses, and blind spots. I draw on the 
developmental psychoanalytic emphasis on unconscious intersubjectivity 
through the concepts of identification, conflict, differentiation and recognition, 
to provide a modified account of gender differences in moral reasoning and 
the ethics of care and justice. My account foregrounds Fred Alford’s concept 
of reparative reasoning (based on Melanie Klein’s notion of reparation) and 
uses Wilfred Bion’s work to go beyond the cognitive traditions of theorising 
thinking and attention. I demonstrate the need to transcend a gendered binary 
between separation/autonomy and connectedness/ relatedness, in recognition 
of the fluid, non-essential, character of gender subjectivity, particularly in the 
contemporary context of greater gender flexibility. 
 
Chapter three. Intersubjectivity in self development. 
Babies’ potential to develop caring capacities lies in the intersubjectivity of 
their mental states and their absolute need for care from a familiar and 
dependable person. If and how they develop the capacity to care is 
fundamentally dependent on intersubjective processes and this chapter 
describes and theorises them in terms of babies’ developing selves, 
unconscious intersubjective dynamics and how meaning is made of their 
experience, especially prior to language development. Central is how they 
develop the ability to imagine and identify with another’s state of mind. I trace 
the developmental struggles through which moral subjectivity is achieved. My 
understanding of moral subjectivity is based on Kleinian and post-Kleinian, 
especially Winnicottian, concepts. I ground much of this in a brief and simple 
example of a 2-year old boy, Carl, who makes a caring gesture to his 
harassed mother when her self control breaks down.   
 
In this chapter I set up a related cluster of themes for elaboration in 
subsequent chapters. I ask how a child differentiates, or separates, from its 
mother or primary carer and how sex and gender affect these processes. I 
suggest that the carer’s recognition of the baby’s states of mind is important in 
how the baby learns recognition, with effects on subjectivity and capacity to 
care. I introduce Bion’s concepts of the container and contained as a non-
cognitive model for learning how to think and its implications for attentiveness. 
An illustration from a longitudinal baby observation provides the basis for 
inferring the internalisation of a parental good object and I consider how this is 
the basis for feelings of self worth and by extension the capacity for self care. 
In this argument, self care and care for others stem from the same source, 
rather than being in conflict. I discuss a question that is central to a psycho-
social approach to subjectivity: the relation between the external reality that 
the baby meets and the inner psychic processes (for example splitting) that 
transform that reality and produce experience and meaning. Last but not 
least, I broaden out the focus on the mother-infant couple to introduce the role 
of dyadic and triangular structures in babies’ development of ‘mental space’ 
and the role of siblings in the development of moral subjectivity. 
 
Chapter four. Maternal subjectivity and the capacity to care 
In this chapter I hold in balance the universal demands of being a mother, 
namely the non-negotiable character of the new infant’s dependency, and the 
situation of the woman who is never only a mother. I try to unsettle the binary 
of other- versus self-centredness in discourses that have characterised 
women’s positions as mothers. I characterise the move into maternal 
subjectivity as a way of confronting, and potentially living up to, the challenges 
of caring for others in a dynamic way from the position of being a subject in 
her own right. Maternal subjectivity is forged out of the love, demands and 
responsibilities that help a baby move out of undifferentiation, omnipotence 
and narcissism - from a state of ‘ruthlessness’ (Winnicott) - to the capacity to 
feel realistic concern for, and therefore be able to care for, another person. 
The demands change continuously with the child’s development, from one-
way care to – ideally - a situation of mutual recognition and interdependency 
that characterises many other care scenarios. These dynamics of maternal 
development are not restricted to biological mothers. 
 
Early mothering is a time that reemphasises, par excellence, the dynamic 
tension between intersubjectivity - on which condition in the mother the new 
baby relies for its psychological wellbeing – and differentiated subjectivity. I 
use Ogden’s concept of the intersubjective third to explore this tension and 
how it can provide a way of understanding selves. I argue that the capacities 
born out of this dialectic can expand beyond being an actual mother or 
woman and provide the basis for ethical life. This is different from the 
valorisation of the feminine that characterised some 1980s feminisms in that it 
does not reserve these characteristics for women but explores how these 
capacities can be generalised through caring relationships, especially in the 
context of the unsettling of gender differences. 
 Chapter five. The gender of parenting, the gender of care 
In this chapter I ask what might be specific to the position of a biological 
mother and if and how might this differ from the father’s position in relation to 
the demands of young children. At the same time I address one political 
question that provides a backdrop to this book; namely ‘what difference might 
it make if fathers rather than mothers were the primary carers for babies and 
children’? To this extent, this chapter focuses on men and boys and what, in 
their current development, may restrict their capacity to care. I take an 
intergenerational approach by keeping in mind the parenting conditions that 
are likely to affect the development of boys’ gendered subjectivity and thus 
their later parental capacities to care. I ask what is particular about the 
(biological) mother’s body, women’s and men’s bodies and their differences 
and how the infant and later child might experience these differences. For this 
purpose I draw on psychoanalytic work that theorises the importance of the 
earliest relations experienced in the mode of embodiment rather than thought 
or language, for later subjectivity, relationality and identificatory capacity. I 
conclude that the mother’s and father’s bodies cannot signify the same in the 
infant’s early experience. Likewise the ‘fantasy of the omnipotent mother’ will 
not generalise to men’s mothering without profound changes in its meaning 
and the child’s experience. 
 
Shifting focus from the sex and gender of the parents to that of the children, I 
draw on Jessica Benjamin’s understanding of preoedipal as well as oedipal 
dynamics and in particular her distinction between the intersubjective 
conditions that help a boy to renounce, as opposed to repudiate, his mother in 
the course of separation. From this, using the idea of cross-sex and cross-
gender parental identifications, it is possible to understand how the 
defensively autonomous character structures typical of masculinity can be 
modified, affecting men’s capacities to care. Finally I move beyond dyadic 
relationships using the emphasis in contemporary psychoanalysis on 
triangularity, the third term and the analytic third in order to complicate the 
question of what children need in order to develop the capacity to imagine 
themselves in the position of the other. I introduce sibling relationships into 
the family picture, showing their influence in the experiencing of love and 
hate, particularly on lateral relationships. 
 
Chapter six. Difference and the capacity to care. 
Throughout the book, the concept of identification has been central to 
theorising the capacity to care and here I try to untangle a common conflation 
between identification and sameness by discussing the conditions for 
identification with differences as well as similarities. I apply the psycho-social 
intersubjective model of the caring self that I have developed in this book to 
several scenarios that diverge from the face-to-face and familiar basis to 
unconscious intersubjectivity derived from the mother-infant couple. These 
cover friendship, institutional care and caring across social difference and 
across distance. 
 
The chapter widens the focus to discuss the subject of ethics in the light of my 
theorisation of the capacity to care and its origins in the mother-infant 
relationship. This takes two directions. In the light of the radically 
intersubjective ontology I have developed throughout the book, I further 
consider Levinas’ similar ontology; also the friendship model of care as an 
alternative and complement to the mother-child model. To test how my 
approach extends from the intimacy of primary face-to-face relations, I ask if 
and how the capacity to care extends to apply to other settings, namely 
institutional care and charitable giving to third world countries. In this way I 
return to the question of justice and the role of motivations to care in political 
obligations. Once defensive autonomy and instrumental reasoning are 
distinguished clearly from justice reasoning, the care-justice dualism is further 
unsettled. 
 
